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Abstract—Sensor networks and Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) are key components for the development of the Internet of Things.
These networks are subject of two kinds of constraints. Adaptability by the mean of mutability and evolutivity, and constrained node
resources such as energy consumption, computational complexity or memory usage. In this context, none of the existing protocols and
models allows reliable peer authentication and trust level management. In the field of virtual economic transactions, Bitcoin has
proposed a new decentralized and evolutive way to model and acknowledge trust and data validity in a peer network by the mean of
the blockchain. We propose a new security model and its protocol based on the blockchain technology to ensure validity and integrity
of cryptographic authentication data and associate peer trust level, from the beginning to the end of the sensor network lifetime.
Index Terms—Bitcoin; blockchain; wsn; authentication; trust management.
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1 INTRODUCTION
S ENSOR Networks and Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN)are two main components involved in the development
of the Internet of Things (IoT). Security and privacy han-
dling for Sensor Networks present new issues due to specific
constraints. Low resources on computation, hardware func-
tionalities and energy consumption in WSNs. We can divide
research work into two categories: security and privacy for
the data being sent over the network on one side, and node
authentication and trust management on the other side.
Both have been actively explored the last ten years, and
some solutions have been brought by researchers. However,
from our knowledge none of these works propose a com-
plete model for both content access, security, privacy and
trust management. In this paper, we focus on addressing
authentication and trust management issues.
1.1 Overview
During our researches, we have separated existing work
into two distinct research areas. The first one is authentica-
tion and trust management issues in decentralized networks
and WSN. Then we consider ongoing work on blockchains
and their applications.
1.1.1 Authentication and trust for decentralized networks
We can find a lot of different approaches for authentica-
tion in WSN and the IoT in the literature. As outlined
by Medaglia et al. [1], WSNs have specific security con-
straints on node authentication to ensure data validity and
confidentiality. Trust management is tied to authentication
mechanisms, as a the mean to identify the trustee and
the truster. We take previous work on trust evaluation in
distributed networks by Sun et al. [2], as a reference on
issues concerning trust in decentralized networks for our
work.
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1.1.2 Blockchain as a secured data structure
Recent work by Zyskind et al. [3] shows the interest of
the blockchain as a personal data management platform
focused on privacy. They outlined how the blockchain helps
leveraging user control over data in the context of social
networks and big data. Foutiou et al. [4] describe a decen-
tralized name based security system using blockchains to
secure contents access in Information-Centric Networking
based architectures. These approaches prove usability of
the blockchain as a secure decentralized data structure for
new applications, but none has been used to provide node
authentication and trust management in Wireless Sensor
Networks (WSN) and in the Internet of Things (IoT).
1.2 Our Contribution
We propose a model based on blockchain data structure
used to store decentralized authentication and node trust
informations. This model is evolutive, adaptative and en-
sure reliability over time.
1.3 Organization
We first explain briefly the blockchain data structure as pre-
sented in Bitcoin. Then we present issues in decentralized
node authentication and trust management for WSN. The
last part of this paper describes our model of a blockchain
based solution for authentication and trust management
which provide a solution to overcome decentralized net-
works issues.
2 THE BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY
In 2008, a person or group of persons known under the
name of Satoshi Nakamoto published a paper [5] deal-
ing with a new decentralized peer-to-peer electronic cash
system. This paper introduces the blockchain as a new
data structure to store financial transactions, as well as an
associate protocol to ensure the validity of the blockchain in
the network.
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22.1 Data structure
In his paper, Nakamoto describes the blockchain as a
database modeled by a linear sequence of blocks, each
one containing cryptographic hashes corresponding to the
previous and current block to ensure continuity and im-
mutability. Bitcoin uses the blockchain to store financial
transactions and contracts.
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Fig. 1. Bitcoin block chaining mechanism. The Merkle root of all transac-
tions is included in the block header and then used as input for the next
block in the chain.
The chaining method used in Bitcoin (Figure 1) ensures
the immutability by using the hash of the previous header
block hash in the current block. The header includes the root
hash of the Merkle tree of all transactions in the block. This
way transactions cannot be changed without changing the
root Merkle hash and then invalidating the block. Due to
the way the blockchain is built, fork chains can append with
different valid blocks storing different transactions. The
Bitcoin protocol resolves this issue by selecting the longest
blockchain as the correct one. Note that due to this choice,
even after being included in a valid block, transactions can
be considered valid only after a subsequent block has been
calculated and successfully included in the blockchain by
the majority of the network [6].
2.2 Secure distributed storage based on blockchains
We consider the blockchain data structure outside of its
application in Bitcoin, as a generic decentralized secured
data storage structure. It is possible to use any data payloads
other than transactions as parts of the block. The block is
then divided in two parts, (a) the block constants and header
and (b) the data payloads, as shown in Figure 2.
A single modification in one payload of a block will
change its Merkle root hash value, and then invalidate
it. This solution thus provides secure and reliable storage
distributed among all peers in the network. Note that this
implies that the complete blockchain and all datas linked to
it must be duplicate on all peers. The size of data payloads
will influence both the hash calculation algorithm and band-
width used to maintain the blockchain. Due to bandwidth
restriction in the platform we use, we choose to limit the
total size of a block to 5 MB to ensure we have enough stor-
age for important security and trust informations without
overloading the network with blockchain control data.
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Fig. 2. Blocks used as generic storage. We use structured payloads and
replace transactions by payloads in the Merkle root hash computation.
3 AUTHENTICATION AND TRUST IN WSN
Authentication and trust can be seen as two parts of the
same problem [7]. Authentication allows us to be sure to
who we are dealing with, trust giving us insights of how we
can rely on and dealing with a potential risk on an action. If
we consider the presence of a master authority in charge of
authentication and trust management, we can easily ensure
a good security and privacy level in the network. However,
this has a major drawback, the master authority becomes
the central part of the network security and thus the critical
point of vulnerability in the network. In decentralized and
ad-hoc networks, this approach is impossible, because we
don’t have a node which can assure to be connected at every
moment of the network life.
3.1 Our Framework
To ensure proper organization and content management in
decentralized networks, we use a common content model
based on Service Oriented Architecture [8] adapted for our
application and compatible with CoAP protocol [9]. This
approach allows us to design a RESTful model for inter-
action with the internet, and his currently outlined at one
promising approach to organize sensor networks [10].
3.1.1 Network services model
Before further introspection on our blockchain based model,
we must define the network model we use. Wireless Sensor
Networks can be well described as decentralized networks
composed of resource constrained nodes based on embed-
ded devices. We choose to model the network as an undi-
rected graph G = (V,E), each vertex describing a node in
the network, and each edge links two nodes within trans-
mission range from each other. Then we associate abilities
and services to nodes, providing resources on the network.
In this model we define two entities formalized as a set of
characteristics vectors.
• Network Node (NN) defines a vector of Node Prop-
erties (NP) and another of Node Abilities (NA)
NN =
(
NP =
[
name energy cpu
]
NA =
[
camera storage
] ) (1)
• Available Services (AS) defines an Abilities Depen-
dencies (AD) vector, a Resources Dependencies (RD)
vector and a Resources Provider (RP) vector
3AS =
 AD = [camera storage]RD = []
RP =
[
videostream videorecording
]
 (2)
Each node stores services in a Service Registry (SR).
Nodes having the storage ability can store services they
cannot deploy to ensure reuse of these services in the future
on other nodes.
In the next section, we refer to our service model and
related abbreviations to describe our solution providing
authentication and trust management mechanisms for de-
centralized networks.
4 BLOCKCHAIN AUTHENTICATION AND TRUST
MODULE (BATM)
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is a major component to
resolve authentication in networks. In 1991, Zimmerman
introduce a new concept named web of trust for his Pretty
Good Privacy (PGP) encryption program [11], which was
then standardized by the IETF under the OpenPGP name.
Current version of the standard is described in RFC 4880
[12]. OpenPGP use PKI to provide three main functionali-
ties.
• Confidentiality with Encryption
• Authentication via Digital Signature
• Web of Trust via identity validation from peers
BATM proposes a new way to achieve these goals using
the blockchain as the database to store public keys, digital
signature and peer informations, allowing each component
of the network to validate informations about every other
node in the network.
This section explains the global design of BATM in
regard to three aspects. First, we focus on authentication,
public keys, block mining and their mutual influence. Then
we explain principles and particularities of the block ex-
change protocol and associate rules. Finally, we describe
how the combination of authentication and protocol rules
allows to define a trust management model.
4.1 BATM authentication
BATM associates cryptographic keys with each NN and
AS in the network. We use the idea contained in the PGP
model of a master key to identify a NN or AS among its
lifespan. This key is only used to generate secondary keys
for encryption and digital signature. As in most PKI, private
keys are the main component of the system, and so key
management is particularly critical. An attacker can easily
spoof NN identity if he retrieves its keys. In this regard,
implementations will need to be careful in the choice of
the keyring to store private keys, but we won’t address this
issue in this paper.
4.1.1 BATM block mining
We assimilate each data payload as an event providing
informations about the status of a NN and its cryptographic
informations. At authentication, a node submits a creden-
tial payload containing its master public key along with
Require: currentblock previousblock
Ensure: block validity
1: if not(HashCurrentBlock resolves problem) then
2: return false
3: end if
4: if not(MinerApproval payload valid) then
5: return false
6: end if
7: if CurrentBlock has event payload for miner NN then
8: return false
9: end if
10: if not(all payloads in block valid) then
11: return false
12: end if
13: return true
Fig. 3. Block validity check algorithm.
secondary keys. We ensure key renewal to mitigate attacks
known for guessing keys by using key validity timeouts.
As network security and privacy relies on informations
contained in the blockchain, our design forbid to add blocks
uniquely by resolving the problem and satisfy header hash
requirement. More precisely, only authenticated nodes can
mine new blocks, and only if they haven’t issued a payload
to be included in the block. To fullfill these requirements,
miners must choose which payloads to include in the block
they try to resolve.
To be valid, a block must both resolves the problem and
contains a valid Miner Approval (MA) payload generated
by the Miner, illustrated by the algorithm in Figure 3. This
kind of payload contain a digital signature of a random
value contained in the previous block MA payload, and
must correspond to a successfully authenticated node.
4.1.2 BATM data payloads
When a NN or AS requests to join the network for the first
time, it issues a specific Credential Payload (CP) to all NNs.
A CP contains public keys needed to operate in the network.
Authentication request is approved when an authenticated
NN includes the CP in a valid block.
Credential status of the NN / AS can be subsequently
updated by renew payload and revoke payload. Note that
when revoking his credential, a NN / AS must provide
a new credential payload to remain authenticated in the
network. Miners will try to include revoke payload and new
credential payload in the same block to ensure continuity of
node status in the network.
If we allow submission of payloads without further ver-
ification, every node could be allowed to propose payloads
in the network. To overcome this issue, payloads use a
system of signed hash digests. Every payload must have
a hash digest signed by payload issuer as its last entry. This
way, our payload verification algorithm can easily check
the validity of the data. Note that revoke payload use the
master key to sign data hash, whereas other payloads use
the current signature subkey.
BATM uses 6 different payload types as follows.
• MA (Miner Approval)
• NN and AS Payloads
4Renew Payload
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Fig. 4. Data payloads available in BATM. All blocks must have a Miner
Approval payload to be valid, to verify which node has allowed the
authentication entry.
– Credentials
– Renew
– Blame
– Ban
– Revoke
We provide a detailed description of data contained in
BATM payloads in Figure 4. Note that Blame and Ban pay-
loads are specific payloads used in BATM trust management
model.
We showed how our model of a PKI using the blockchain
ensure reliable storage for cryptographic material, and how
we use it to perform NN authentication on the network. We
then propose a trust management model using informations
contained in the blockchain.
4.2 BATM trust management
The first need for a definition of trust originated from
social studies to characterize relations between people in
the society. In this context, we consider relevant to use
Gambetta’s definition of trust [13] as an assumption on the
level of subjective probability about how a particular agent
will perform an action from a subjective point of view. Note
that we understand the term of subjective probability as a
reputation level applied to the realization correctness of a
subsequent action in the future.
This interpretation of trust implies that the reputation
level associated with an agent must vary over time to match
the actual realization of the action. Good behaviour must be
rewarded, and bad behaviour must be punished to maintain
accurate prediction on the realization of actions.
4.2.1 Knowledge based trust for BATM
The BATM module includes a trust model called Human-
like Knowledge based Trust (HKT), based on human like
behaviour to maintain a reputation level for each node. HKT
is a compromise between a mutual surveillance by all nodes
on the network and the presence of a trust center.
We use the payloads contained in the blockchain as an
indication of each node behaviour on the network over
time. This way, we ensure a node cannot fool others by
tampering data or pretending to be someone else. Thus we
ensure reliability of trust evaluation without the need of
a trust center. Following development will be targeted at
NN trust evaluation, but same principles apply to AS, with
the particularity that AS reputation level is echoed on each
node in the network, thus modifying reputation level on
each node using it.
For each payload type, HKT defines events and asso-
ciates them reputation factors. We note Cevt the reputation
factor for the event, and Tevt the time the event occured.
To make the NN reputation evolve naturally over time,
each event reputation factor must be weighted by a function
evolving in time since the event occurs. As we want to
decreasing contribution of a particular event to the NN
reputation level over time, we need to use a continuous
decreasing function such as e−x.
During it first authentication, a NN has no passed action
to compute a reliable trust value. Thus we choose to grant
a base trust value to all nodes when a trusted node gives
them access to the network by including their credentials in
the blockchain.
For the simulations, we used the following values for
event reputation factors.
• Capproval = 1
• Cauth = 8
• Crenew = 2
• Cblame = −8
• Cban = −16
We have estimated the following formulas to determine
the reputation of node over time.
∀evt ∈ (N,Blk(t)) : CN,t =
∑
Cevt (3)
Reputation(N, tnow) = Cauth +
t=tnow∑
t=tfirst
CN,t ∗ e
−(tnow−t)
256
(4)
In this formula, tfirst corresponds to the first block in
the blockchain after node has authenticated. Ct is used as
the global coefficient for all events concerning the node at t
(the sum of all Cevt at t).
4.2.2 Trust evaluation
As we defined it earlier, we consider trust as a probability
level that an action will be performed correctly by a NN.
In this context, we perform trust evaluation by comparing
the current reputation level of a NN to trust him doing
certain actions in the network. Currently, we only defined
blockchain related actions and associate them with a trust
level Aevt. This level quantifies the minimum reputation
level for a node to be trusted to fullfill subsequent event evt.
The trust level is weighted by the number of authenticated
NN notedNauth, in order to be less restrictive on actions in a
small network and more on huge networks. This behaviour
allows NN on the network to work properly and becoming
trust defaultive in small network, and then raise the trust
level required when more nodes are available.
BATM defines the following trust levels, as equivalent
for trust events Cevt described earlier.
• Aauth
5Fig. 5. Reputation level simulation over 500 hours with 3 NN. After 2
blames, a ban is declared on the node and becomes effective for a 84
hours.
• Aban
• Ablame
• Aapproval
We provide following formula to compute values of Aact
over time, with Aapp being an application factor, allowing
applications to be more or less restrictive on actions.
Aevt = Cevt +
Aapp ∗ (Nauth − 1)
Cevt
(5)
Note that reputation level simulation in Figure 5 does
not consider minimum trust level required for a NN to
fullfill an action.
We showed how BATM with HKT provide a power-
ful solution to authenticate nodes and evaluate trust in
decentralized networks. The system can be made instable
by malicious authenticated nodes overloading the network
and submitting lots of valid payloads for inclusion in the
blockchain. To overcome this issue, we define specific rules
for payload submission in the network to improve stability
of the system over time.
4.3 BATM payload rules
To avoid abuse from NN which can overload the network
with payloads to be validated, we introduce specific rules
on the payload exchange protocol for BATM. We consider
two type of rules : timers, key validity timeouts and event
reputation factors described earlier. Timers are limitation in
time used to discard payloads and blocks submitted by NN
overloading the network.
A set of timers defines the minimum amount of time
expected between two payloads of the same type. BATM
currently uses 3 timers as follows.
• Trenew is the usual time between two key renewal by
a node. If needed, a node is authorized to renew its
keys at Trenew/2. Here we ensure there are at most 2
renews in a Trenew for a given NN.
• Tblame is the minimum time between two blames on
a NN given by the same blamer NN.
• Tbanrecover is the time during which a banned NN
will be forbidden to mine subsequent block as pun-
ishment for a bad behaviour in the network.
These timers imply that key validity timeouts must
respect the following rules for BATM to work properly.
• Tsubkey is the timeout for subkeys before renewal. It
must be greater than Trenew, but less than 50∗Trenew
to be overcome issue that an attacker may be able to
guess the key from data collected in the network.
• Tmasterkey is the timeout for the master key. In our
model, it should be greater than 10 ∗ Tsubkey and no
more than 50∗Tsubkey to protect it from key guessing
attacks.
As indication, simulation results showed in Figure 5
used following timer values, in hours.
• Trenew = 168
• Tblame = 42
• Tbanrecover = 84
As these rules can be defined to different values regard-
ing the application using BATM, we use the first block in
the blockchain to store values to be used. Thresholds will
be defined in the future to overcome a problem with a
malicious initial NN, and what we called the origin block
problem.
4.3.1 Origin block problem
At startup, the network contains no authenticated node to
realize BATM authentication and trust evaluation, and the
blockchain is empty. This means we need a method to forge
the first block. We choose to let any node craft this special
block from its own parameters. In fact, the main problem is
to ensure proper operation in the beginning of the network
life, then BATM will adapt itself to events occuring in the
network. If the first NN is malicious, it will be banned by
others node early in the network.
Since the first block contains all mutable values used
in BATM, a possible attack will be the inclusion of specific
values which will tend the system to misbehave. To counter
this threat, future work will provide a formula to estimate
the probability of BATM instability from these values.
5 FUTURE WORK
We presented the concept and model of BATM, with early
results on reputation evaluation over time. The next step is
to evaluate each part of BATM completely and the global
model. The model itself will be improved depending on
the results, with the objective of more adaptative algorithms
taking AS and NN characteristics as defined in our model.
5.1 Trust model
BATM with HKT provide a simple way to manage trust
in decentralized networks. More researches on HKT per-
formance must be conducted, and the model itself may
evolve to consider more parameters in trust and reputa-
tion evaluation. We think about considering NN and AS
abilities in account for specific actions, and enhance the
reputation calculations. For example, a blamer reputation
6could influence the reputation factor of its blame, and we
may introduce a time coefficient to raise trust on the overall
time presence of the NN or AS in the network. Another
possibility is to raise resilience over DoS attacks by requiring
blames from different NN or AS before banning one.
In this paper, we consider self-organizing networks with
no constraints on which NN may ask to authenticate. We
also let possible a derivative model, using a network mas-
ter key to allow blockchain supervision and eliminate the
first block problem. A possibility may be to allow specific
network, for example vendor-specific networks, where NN
can provide a proof of membership by prior network master
key signature.
5.2 Real world testing
If simulation results fullfill our expectations, BATM will
be included in Multicast Services for Linux (MSL), an
implementation our SOA network model. Note that MSL
is at development stage for now with now release date.
Moreover, MSL is intended to be used as a real world proof
of concept for our overall design including SOA model and
BATM with HKT.
6 CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a new application for the blockchain
as a secured decentralized storage for cryptographic keys
as well as trust informations in the context of autonomous
Wireless Sensor Networks. The Blockchain Authentication
and Trust Module and its Human-like Knowledge based
Trust model shows how to use to immutability of the
blockchain to provide solutions to high problematics in the
field of decentralized ad-hoc networks. More precisely, we
show how it is possible to build a complete solution provid-
ing authentication mechanisms as well as trust evaluation
in a self-organized and evolutive network.
Resources
The Service Oriented model is currently under development
into the Multicast Services for Linux (MSL) framework.
MSL is a free software and will be publicly available at
https://bullekeup.github.io/MSL, under the AGPL license.
BATM will be available in MSL in the next months. HKT
simulation files for GNU Octave and MATLAB are available
by mail on request at axel.moinet@u-bourgogne.fr.
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